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This paper shows that all perfect Bayesian equilibria of a decentralized dynamic matching market
with two-sided incomplete information of independent private values variety converge to competitive
equilibria. Each buyer wants to purchase a bundle of heterogeneous, indivisible goods and each seller
owns one unit of a heterogeneous indivisible good (as in Kelso and Crawford (1982) or Gul and
Stacchetti (1999)). Buyer preferences and endowments as well as seller costs are private information.
Agents engage in costly search and meet randomly. The terms of trade are determined through
bilateral bargaining between buyers and sellers. The paper considers a market in steady state. It
is shown that as frictions, i.e., discounting and ﬁxed costs of search become small, all equilibria of
the market game converge to perfectly competitive equilibria.
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1. Introduction
This paper shows that all equilibria of a dynamic matching and bargaining game with two-
sided incomplete information of the independent private values variety converge to competitive
equilibria. In the model each buyer aims to purchase a bundle of heterogeneous, indivisible objects
and each seller owns one unit of a heterogeneous indivisible good (as in Kelso and Crawford (1982)
or Gul and Stacchetti (1999)). Buyer preferences and endowments as well as seller costs are private
information. Agents engage in costly search and meet randomly. The terms of trade are determined
through bilateral bargaining under incomplete information between buyers and sellers. The paper
considers a market in steady state and shows that as frictions, i.e., discounting and the ﬁxed cost
of search, become small for all agents, the market becomes perfectly competitive.
Convergence to a competitive equilibrium in a decentralized market for a homogeneous good is
established by Gale (1987). This result is extended to the case of incomplete information about
buyer preferences in a two-type model by Moreno and Wooders (2002) and two-sided incomplete
information by Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2006). In the models of DeFraja and Sakovics (2001),
Serrano (2002) and Wolinsky (1990) convergence to a competitive equilibrium fails. The failure of
convergence to competitive equilibrium is caused by the bilateral bargaining protocol in Serrano
(2002), results from the ineﬃciency of aggregating common value information through bilateral
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meeting in Wolinsky (1990) and is due to the “clones” assumption in DeFraja and Sakovics (2001)
(see Lauermann (2006) for a detailed discussion of these issues).
2. The Model
Buyers and sellers in the economy search for possible trading partners. Each seller owns one
indivisible good for sale and each buyer wants to purchase a bundle of the indivisible goods oﬀered
for sale. The game progresses in discrete time and agents discount the future with a common
discount factor δ. In each period, an agent incurs a positive search cost c and meets pairwise with
a potential partner. Either the buyer or the seller is designated as the proposer. The probability
that the buyer is designated as the proposer is β ∈ (0,1). The proposer oﬀers a direct mechanism
and the responder chooses whether to participate in the mechanism. If the responder participates
in the mechanism, then the agents report their types to the mechanism and the mechanism chooses
the probability with which a trade occurs and speciﬁes the transfers to be paid by the buyer to the
seller. Sellers who trade permanently leave the market. Buyers remain in the economy until they
have purchased all the goods that they want, then they leave the market and consume their bundle.
Agents who fail to trade return to the searching population. Utility is transferable. If a buyer of
type b consumes bundle G, then she enjoys utility hbG. A seller incurs cost rs when she sells her
good. So trade between b and sellers s ∈ G creates total transferable utility fbG = hbG −
P
s∈G rs.
2.1. Population of Types and Private Information. Let B and S denote the ﬁnite sets of
initial buyer and seller types and I = B ∪ S denotes the set of all initial types. A seller’s type
speciﬁes the good she owns, xs, and her reservation value (or cost) rs. Let X denote the set of goods
potentially traded in the market, i.e, if xs is the good owned by seller s, then X = {xs : s ∈ S}.
A buyer’s initial type speciﬁes the buyer’s utility function hb : P(S) → R, where P(S) denotes the
set of all subsets of S. The utility function for any buyer b satisﬁes:
(i) hb∅ = 0,
(ii) Monotonicity: If G ⊃ A, then hbG ≥ hbA
(iii) Identity Independence: For any s and s0 with xs = xs0 (i.e., sellers who own the same good),
hbG∪{s} = hbG∪{s0} for all G.
Once in the market, a buyer’s type changes after each trade and includes information on all
trades that the agent has made and consequently the goods the buyer owns. So, refer to a buyer
type by bG, where b ∈ B is the initial type, i.e., her utility function, and G is the set of seller types
with whom she has already traded. Consequently, the set of buyer types present in the market is
T = B × P(S).
In each period, a unit measure of each b ∈ B and s ∈ S are available to enter the market.
Consequently, in each period a measure |B| of buyers and measure |S| of sellers potentially enter
the market. Buyers and sellers, who do not enter the market in a given period, are assumed to
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Let l = (lb1,...,lbG,...,l|B||2S|,ls1,...,l|S|) denote the steady state measure of buyers and sellers in
the market, i.e., l ∈ R
|B|×|2S|+|S|
+ . The steady state probability for any seller of meeting buyer b, or









b∈T lb and LS =
P
s∈S ls. The total measure of buyer b and seller s pairs formed in
a period is lspb = lbps and the total measure of pairs formed is equal to min{LB,LS}. The (sub)
probability measures pb and ps (or type distributions) are commonly known by all agents.
The analysis here assumes independent private values. More precisely, when a buyer and seller
make a trade, the payoﬀ to each agent depends only on the terms of trade and their own private
information but not on their trading partner’s private information. Reference to this assumption,
which is stated formally below, is omitted from the statements of the results presented since it is
maintained throughout the paper.
Assumption: Independent Private Values. If buyer bG and seller s meet, then the buyer
observes, xs, the good that seller s has for sale, while bG and rs remain as private information.
Also, further assume that the agents know the distribution of types in the economy and that any
agent’s prior belief about his/her trading partner’s type coincides with the distribution of types. This
requirement is stronger than what is needed for showing convergence to a competitive equilibrium.
As long as the support of any agent’s prior belief coincides with the support of the steady state
distribution, the convergence results will continue to hold.
2.2. Agent Behavior and Strategies. Let σi denote a strategy for type i and σ = (σi)i∈I a
strategy proﬁle. Assume that all agents use stationary time-invariant strategies (σt = σ for all t).
At the start of each period, the strategy determines whether the agent remains in (or enters) the
market and pays the cost c. Denote by σi(in) the probability that agent i remains in (or enters)
the market in any period. If i is paired in the current period and is the proposer, then the strategy
σi returns a (direct) mechanism choice µi. If agent i is the responder, then the strategy speciﬁes
whether she accepts to participate in the mechanism. If the responder accepts to participate, then
the two agents report types k and j to the mechanism and the mechanism chooses a probability
of trade and the transfer to be paid by the buyer to the seller. The proposer can condition her
mechanism oﬀer and the responder can condition her type report on: the measure of agents in the
economy l, other common knowledge parameters of the economy, and the observable characteristics
of her partner for the period. The responder can also condition her report on the mechanism choice
of the proposer. Without loss of generality, assume that the proposer oﬀers an individually rational
and (interim) incentive compatible mechanism and the responder always participates and reports
her type truthfully. Consequently, a strategy for type i is given by σi = (σi(in),µi).4 ALP E. ATAKAN
The game played in each period involves a direct mechanism choice, that satisﬁes individual
rationality and incentive compatibility constraints, by an informed proposer (principle) (see for
example Myerson (1983) or Maskin and Tirole (1990)). However, the Lemma below shows that
the private information of the proposer is unimportant. In fact, the proposer chooses the same
mechanism she would have chosen even if her type was publicly know. In particular, since buyers
and sellers are risk neutral, a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer is an optimal mechanism for the proposer (as
in Riley and Zeckhauser (1983)).
Lemma 1. The equilibrium mechanism choices satisfy the following:
(i) If µi is the optimal (direct) mechanism choice for type i, when type i is proposing and her
type is known to the responder, then the direct mechanism µ = (µi), i.e., the mechanism
that uses µi when the proposer reports type i to the mechanism, is an optimal mechanism
choice for all i, when the proposer’s type is private information.
(ii) A take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer is optimal when the proposer’s type is know, consequently a type
speciﬁc take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer is an optimal mechanism for any proposer.
(iii) If s and s0 own the same good and rs ≥ r0
s then the take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer ts ≥ t0
s in any
equilibrium.
In the case where each buyer only wants to purchase a single good, then a property analogous
to item (iii) also holds for all buyers.
Let the match probability mbs (or msb) denote the probability that b and s trade, given that the
two are paired in the period and b (or s) is chosen as the proposer. Also, let tbs (or tsb) denote
the transfer paid by the buyer to the seller, given that b and s are paired in the period, b (or s) is
chosen as the proposer and they trade. The reward function for a buyer b (or seller s ) proposing
(responding) to seller s (buyer b) is πb(σ,s) = −c − mbstbs (or πs(σ,b) = −c + mbs(tbs − rs)). If
an agent has exited the market or has accepted a match in a prior period, then the agent is paired
with 0, and πi(σ,0) = 0. Also, if the agent does not get paired in a period, then she/he is paired
with herself and πi(σ,i) = −c.
The expected future value at the start of a period for a seller equals the maximum of the value
of remaining in the market and the value of leaving the market, i.e., vs = max{vs(in),0}. The
expected future value at the start of a period for a buyer equals the maximum of the value of
remaining in the market and the value of leaving the market and consuming the bundle that they
own, that is, vb = max{vb(in),hbG(b)} where for each b ∈ T, G(b) denotes the set of seller types
with whom type b has already traded. The value of remaining in the economy, vb(in), satisﬁes









s ps(1 − β)msb)δvb.COMPETITIVE MATCHING 5
where the notation b ∪ s (or b \ s) denotes a type b0 with hb = hb0 and G(b0) = G(b) ∪ {s} (or
G(b0) = G(b) \ s). In words, buyer b pays the search (sampling) cost c, then successfully makes a
trade as the responder with seller s with probability (1−β)psmsb; makes a trade when she proposes
to buyer s with probability βpsmbs; and does not trade in the period and receives her continuation




s ps(1 − β)msb). Continuation values are deﬁned
similarly for the sellers. Rearranging gives the following for buyer and seller values:
vs(in) = −c + β
X
b∈T pbmbs(tbs − rs − δvs)
+ (1 − β)
X
b∈T pbmsb(tsb − rs − δvs) + δvs, and
vb(in) = −c + β
X
s psmbs(δvb∪s − δvb − tbs)
+ (1 − β)
X
s psmsbδ(vb∪s − δvb − tsb) + δvb,
for any b and s.
2.3. Steady State. Assuming that the economy remains in steady state implies that the number
of type b buyers (or type s sellers) entering the market in each period must equal the number of
that type leaving the market. Consequently, the steady state measure of agents in the economy, l,
satisﬁes the following steady state equations
lb(
X
s∈S Mbs + σb(out)) = σb(in)
ls(
X
b∈T Msb + σs(out)) = σs(in)
for all types b ∈ T with b(G) = ∅ and all sellers s ∈ S, where Mbs = ps(βmbs + (1 − β)msb)
denotes the fraction of type b buyers who are successfully matched with type s sellers, σb(out) =
(1−
P
s∈S Mbs)(1−σb(in)) denotes the fraction of type b buyers, who failed to trade in the previous
period, that choose to leave at start of the current period, and σb(in) ≤ 1 is the ﬂow of new buyers
into the market at the start of the period. Also,
lb(
X
s∈S Mbs + σb(out)) = σb(in)
X
s∈G(b) lb\sMb\ss
for b ∈ T with b(G) 6= ∅, where σb(in)
P
s∈G(b) lb\sMb\ss is the measure of newly created type b
buyers who remain in the market.
2.4. Equilibrium. A steady state search equilibrium is comprised of a mutually compatible strat-
egy proﬁle σ and steady state measure l. That is to say, the measure l satisﬁes the steady state
equations, given that agents use strategy proﬁle σ and, the strategy proﬁle σ comprises a Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium for the market game, given that the steady state measure of agent is l.
2.5. The Competitive Benchmark. The competitive equilibrium benchmark considered here
is a “ﬂow” equilibrium as in Gale (1987) or Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2006), generalized to6 ALP E. ATAKAN
accommodate heterogenous goods and multi-unit demand. In each period, ﬂow supply is the
measure of sellers of a particular good entering the market and ﬂow demand is the measure of
agents willing to purchase a particular good entering the market. In a ﬂow equilibrium, the buyer
and seller continuation values, which are the implicit prices, equate ﬂow supply to ﬂow demand for
each good that is traded in the market. The competitive equilibrium allocations for economy I =
B ∪S is described by the following linear program (and its dual) which is the classical Assignment
Problem where fractional assignments are permitted. This formulation is a generalization of Shapley
and Shubik (1972) to a setting where buyers can purchase multiple commodities as in Kelso and



















sG qbG ≤ 1 for all s, vb +
X
s∈G vs ≥ hbG −
X
s∈G rs ∀b,G. (2)
X
G⊂S qbG ≤ 1 for all b. (3)
The vector q that solves the program is a competitive allocation and denotes the measure of
matches between buyer b and sellers in the set G that are created in each period of time. Any vector
v that solves the dual program is a competitive equilibrium utility vector and the competitive price
of a traded good is pxs = vs+rs. The constraint given by equation (2) states that the ﬂow demand




sG qbG, must be less than the ﬂow supply of that type, which is
at most one. This constraint will bind, if the good’s price is positive, or more precisely, if vs > 0
and thus pxs = vs + rs > rs. The constraint given by equation (3) states that the ﬂow supply to
buyers of type b, must be less than the ﬂow demand by type b, which is at most one. Again, this
constraint will bind if vb > 0. Together inequalities (2) and (3) ensure market clearing.
3. Convergence to Competitive Equilibria
The following shows that a steady state search equilibrium exists for any conﬁguration of search
frictions, that is, for any δ and c (Theorem 2 and Corollary 2). Also, as search becomes costless, i.e.,
δ → 1 and c → 0, any sequence of steady state equilibria converges to a competitive equilibrium
(Theorem 1 and Corollary 1). The analysis focuses on sequences of equilibria (ln,σn), and the
associated sequences of equilibrium match probabilities mn, type distributions pn and values vn,
as search costs disappear, i.e., as (cn,δn) → (0,1).
Let
qn
b(i)G(i) = liσi(out) + (1 − σn
i (in))
X
s∈G(i) li\sMi\ssCOMPETITIVE MATCHING 7
denote measure of buyers with initial type b(i) ∈ B leaving the market with bundle G(i). Since the
market is in steady state 0 ≤ qn
bG ≤ 1 for all b ∈ B, G ⊂ S and n. Also, let
en
bG = hbG −
X
s∈G rs − vb −
X
s∈G vs
denote the Excess between any initial buyer type b ∈ B and sellers in the set G; and similarly
eis = δvi∪s − δvi − δvs − rs
denote the excess between buyer i ∈ T and seller s. Note that, 0 ≤ vn
i ≤ ¯ h; and −(|S|+1)(¯ h+¯ r) ≤
en
ij ≤ ¯ h. Consequently, the sequence (qn,en,vn,pn) is included in a compact set and has a con-
vergent subsequence. From hereon restrict attention to convergent subsequences (qn,en,vn,pn) →
(ˆ q, ˆ s, ˆ e, ˆ p).
Assume that the explicit search costs cn do not converge to zero faster than the implicit time
costs δn. This assumption is stated more precisely below. This assumption ensures that the market
is not clogged up by agents, that have no hope of trading and no incentive to leave, accumulating
in the economy.
Assumption: Uniform Rate of Convergence (URC). There exists an r such that rcn ≥ (1−δn)
for all n.
Initially assume that in the ﬁrst period for each agent, the agent does not pay the search cost c,
that is, the ﬁrst draw from the distribution comes for free. This assumption ensures that all agents
enter the market and there are no coordination problems in entry that could result in a missing
market.1 At the end of this subsection, this assumption that the ﬁrst draw comes for free is relaxed.
Also, since the ﬁrst draw is free, 1 ≤ lb, for all b and 1 ≤ ls for all s.
Assumption: Free First Draw (FD). The search cost c is not paid in the ﬁrst period for an
agent and a unit measure of each type enters the market in each period. Consequently, all agents
sample the distribution at least once.
Formally the assumption requires that the choice of not-entering the market and opting for an
outside option is not available to agents at the start of their ﬁrst period in the market. This choice
becomes available only after one period in the market.
The following theorem shows that any sequence of steady state search equilibria converges to
a competitive equilibrium under the (URC) and (FD) assumptions. The proof ﬁrst shows that
the per-period exit rate of buyers with goods in the set G (i.e., ˆ qbG) is a feasible choice for the
Assignment Problem and so the ﬂow creation of value in the economy is at most as large as the
maximized value of the Assignment Problem. The argument proceeds to show that the Excess ˆ eij
between any buyer i and seller j as well as the Excess between any initial type b and sellers in the
1If the ﬁrst draw was not for free, then no agent entering the economy is an equilibrium. Also, see Example 1 at the
end of the section for a more robust coordination failure.8 ALP E. ATAKAN
set G, i.e., ˆ ebG is non-positive. No Excess then implies that the vector of equilibrium values v is
a feasible choice for the dual of the Assignment Problem and consequently that the ﬂow creation
of value in the economy is at least as large as the maximized value of the Assignment Problem.
The (URC) and (FD) assumptions together essentially imply that if a buyer waits long enough,
then she can meet any seller and make this seller a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer. This drives the Excess
between any two agents to zero as search frictions vanish.
Theorem 1. Assume (URC) and (FD). If (qn,vn) → (ˆ q, ˆ v), then ˆ q solves the primal Assignment
Problem and is a competitive equilibrium allocation; ˆ v solves the dual Assignment Problem and is




bG is the measure of buyers, whose initial type was b, present in the market.
P
G⊂S ln
bG is in steady state since it is the sum of the steady state measures ln
bG. The number of














s denotes the measure of agents who own the good that initially belonged to a seller
of type s and this measure is also in steady state since it is just a sum of steady state variables. In






















sG ˆ qbG ≤ 1 for all s and
X
G ˆ qbG ≤ 1 for all b.





G⊂S ˆ qbG(hbG −
X
s∈G rs) ≤ P.
By Lemma 4 in the appendix, ˆ ebG ≤ 0 for all b and G , this implies that ˆ v is feasible for the dual
and consequently,
P
B ˆ vb +
P










G⊂S ˆ qbG(hbG −
X
s∈G rs)COMPETITIVE MATCHING 9











G⊂S ˆ qbG(hbG −
X
s∈G rs) ≤ P = D
and so
P
B×S ˆ qbsfbs = P proving that ˆ q is a competitive allocation and ˆ v is a competitive equilibrium
utility vector. 
Below that assumption that all agents receive their ﬁrst draw for free is dropped and replaced by
a “tighter” version. In particular, following provides a necessary and suﬃcient condition for every
sequence of search equilibria to convergence to a competitive equilibrium. The condition requires
that an arbitrarily small but positive measure of the lowest cost seller of each good receive their
ﬁrst draw for free (or enter the market by accident).
Assumption: FD for Low Cost Sellers (FDL). In each period, there is εx > 0 entry by the
lowest cost seller of each good x.
Again, formally this assumption requires that the choice of not-entering the market and opting
for an outside option is not available for a fraction εx > 0 of sellers at the start of their ﬁrst period
in the market. This choice becomes available only after one period in the market.
The following corollary establishes convergence to competitive equilibrium under this assumption.
The argument shows that (FDL) and (URC) together are suﬃcient to show No Excess between
any two agents.
Corollary 1. Assume (URC) and (FDL). If (qn,vn) → (ˆ q, ˆ v), then ˆ q solves the primal Assignment
Problem and is a competitive equilibrium allocation; ˆ v solves the dual Assignment Problem and is
a competitive equilibrium utility vector; and ˆ vs + rs is a competitive equilibrium price for good xs.
Proof. To show convergence, ˆ ebG ≤ 0 (no excess) is established. Once, ˆ ebG ≤ 0, then the corollary
follows from the argument in Theorem 1. Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 are valid under the assumption
of the corollary. Also, Lemma 4 can also be applied as follows: Let ix denote the lowest cost seller
of good x. By Lemma 4, ˆ eGb ≤ 0 for all b and G ⊂ {ix}.
For any two sellers of good x, vs − vs0 ≤ vs(in) − vs0(in) and so,
(vs(in) − vs0(in))(1 − δ) ≤ β
X
b∈T pbmbs(rs0 + δvs0 − rs − δvs)
+ (1 − β)
X
b∈T pbmsb(rs0 + δvs0 − rs − δvs)
Also, suppose, without loss of generality, that rs0 ≥ rs.
(vs − vs0)(1 − δ) ≤ ((rs0 − rs) − δ(vs − vs0))
X
b∈T Msb
(vs − vs0) ≤ (rs0 − rs)
P
b∈T Msb
(1 − δ) + δ
P
b∈T Msb
≤ (rs0 − rs)10 ALP E. ATAKAN
Consequently, δvs +rs ≤ δvs0 +rs0. For any set G of sellers, let H denote the set of sellers where
each s ∈ G is replaced by ixs, i.e., the lowest cost seller who owns the same good as seller s. So,
hbG = hbH, also, δvs + rs ≤ δvs0 + rs0 for any s0 ∈ G and s ∈ H with xs0 = xs. Consequently,
ebG = hbG −
X
s∈G(δvs + rs) − δvb ≤ hbH −
X
s∈H(δvs + rs) − δvb = ebH
However, en
bH → ˆ ebH ≤ 0 since H ⊂ ix. So, ˆ ebG = limen
bG ≤ limen
bH ≤ 0 proving that ˆ ebG ≤ 0. 
As pointed out the condition outlined in Assumption (FDL) is also necessary in the following
limited sense: if Assumption (FDL) does not hold, then there exists a sequence of steady state
equilibria for an economy that fails to converge to a competitive equilibrium of that economy. The
following is such an example.
Example: Necessity of FDL. Consider an economy with two buyer types and two seller types,
where each buyer wants to purchase only one good and the two seller types own two diﬀerent goods.
Let h12 = h21 = 0 and h11 = h22 = 1, that is h is super-modular; buyer 1 likes seller 1’s good and
buyer 2 likes seller 2’s good. Suppose r1 = r2 = 0. Let δ = 1. For any c ≤ 1/2, a unit measure
of type 1 buyers and a unit measure of type 1 sellers entering, no type 2 buyers or sellers entering
and all meetings resulting in a trade at a price of 1/2 is an equilibrium. Clearly such a sequence
does not converge to the competitive equilibrium of the economy. However, if a tiny fraction ε2 of
type 2 sellers where to enter in each period, then for c ≤ ε2
1+ε2 the buyers of type 2 would also ﬁnd
it proﬁtable to enter. This results in the markets for both goods operating and leads to convergence
to a competitive equilibrium.
3.1. Existence of a Steady State Search Equilibrium. The following theorem establishes
equilibrium existence for any δ ∈ [0,1] and c > 0. A trivial no-trade equilibrium always exists. The
theorem below assumes (FD) (or (FDL)) and consequently establishes the existence of a full-trade
equilibrium.
Theorem 2. Assume (FD) or (FDL). For any (c,δ) a search equilibrium (l,σ) exists.
Assumption: Uniqueness (UNQ). The set of goods traded in any competitive equilibrium is the
same. That is if good x is not traded in one competitive equilibrium, then it is not traded in any
other CE.
Assumption: Decreasing Returns (DR). If G ⊂ H, then hbH∪{s} − hbH ≤ hbG∪{s} − hbG for
all b and s.
Corollary 2. Assume (URC), (UNQ) and (DR). There exists a sequence (qn,vn) → (ˆ q, ˆ v), such
that ˆ q solves the primal Assignment Problem and is a competitive equilibrium allocation; ˆ v solves the
dual Assignment Problem and is a competitive equilibrium utility vector; and ˆ vs+rs is a competitive
equilibrium price for good xs.COMPETITIVE MATCHING 11
Proof. By (UNQ), the set of goods can be partitioned into two sets H ⊂ X and X \ H where H
denotes the set of goods that are traded in any competitive equilibrium. Let qx denote the measure
of good x traded by the lowest cost sellers of good x, i.e., by sellers Sx = {s : xs = x and rs ≤
r0








Also, let qx = minq∈Qqx where Q denotes the set of competitive allocations. Note that Q is a
compact and convex set and qx > 0 for any x ∈ H. Assume (FDL) for all x ∈ H and let the
measure of low cost sellers of good x ∈ H receiving the ﬁrst draw free be 0 < εx < qx. Observe that
given this set-up, the sequence of equilibria will converge to ˆ q, which is competitive equilibrium for
the economy comprised of sellers such that xs ∈ H and b ∈ B. Also, observe that since only goods
in H are traded, q is also an eﬃcient allocation for the original economy I. For any buyer b with
ˆ lb > 0, ˆ ebG ≤ 0 for any G ⊂ S. For any buyer with ˆ lb = 0, ˆ ebG ≤ 0 for any G ⊂ {s : xs ∈ X \ H}.
This is because otherwise, i.e., is ˆ ebG > 0, then allocating to b, who is not trading, the goods in G,
which are not being traded, would improve the eﬃciency of the matching which would contradict
that the matching ˆ q is eﬃcient. So ˆ ebG ≤ 0 for G ⊂ {s : xs ∈ X \ H}. Also, for ˆ lb = 0, ˆ ebG ≤ 0 for
any G ⊂ {s : xs ∈ H} by Corollary 1. But, ˆ ebG ≤ 0 for G ⊂ {s : xs ∈ H} and G ⊂ {s : xs ∈ X \H}
in conjunction with (DR) implies that ˆ ebG ≤ 0 for all b and G ⊂ S. This, in turn, shows that the
allocation ˆ q is a competitive equilibrium allocation for I and ˆ v is a competitive utility vector.
Now observe that for suﬃciently large n, σn
sx(in) > εx since the measure of lowest cost sellers
leaving the market must converge to competitive competitive equilibrium which exceeds qx. This
implies that for n suﬃciently large vs(in) ≥ 0. This shows that we can drop the (FDL) assumption
which is not binding for suﬃciently large n and just take entry by type sx to equal σn
sx(in). 
4. Discussion and Conclusion
Appendix A. Omitted Proofs
A.1. Proof of Lemma 1. Proof of item (i) is bellow. Item (ii) follows from Riley and Zeckhauser
(1983). Item (iii) follows since Corollary 1 showed that δvs+rs ≤ δvs0+rs0 for two sellers of the same
good with rs ≤ rs0. A similar argument in the non-stationary case yields δvs +rs ≤ δvs0 +rs0. The
take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer can be viewed as the choice of an optimal monopoly price where marginal
cost is equal to δvs + rs. Consequently, if δvs + rs ≤ δvs0 + rs0, then the optimal monopoly price
ts ≤ ts0.
I show, if µi = (mi,ti) is the optimal mechanism for type i, when type i is proposing and her
type is known to the responder, then the mechanism µ = (µi) is an optimal mechanism choice for
all i, when the proposer’s type is private information. The proof follows the line of reasoning in
Yilankaya (1999). By the Inscrutability Principal of Myerson (1983), we can assume without loss of
generality, that all proposers choose the same mechanism. This mechanism choice by the proposer12 ALP E. ATAKAN
cannot do better in expectation than the ex-ante optimal mechanism. Below it is shown that the ex-
ante optimal mechanism is just µ = (µi). However, the mechanism choice µ = (µi) is also available
for the proposer and will therefore be chosen. Let ˆ rs = rs +δvs ≥ 0 and ˆ hbG = δ(vbG∪s −vbG). The




BP(G)×S pbps(tb,s − mbsˆ rs)
Subject to the incentive compatibility constraint
X
S ps(mjsˆ hb − tjs) ≤
X
S ps(mb,sˆ hb − tb,s)
the individual rationality constraint
X
S ps(mb,sˆ hb − tb,s) ≥ 0
and the resource constraint mbs ≤ 1. Alter the problem as follows: let hb = max{ˆ hb,0} for all
b ∈ BP(G) and add a buyer 0 with h0 < 0 and p0 = 0. Also, drop the individual rationality
constraint for all buyers except buyer 0. The modiﬁed ex-ante problem is then
V x = max
m,t≥0
X
BP(G)×S pbps(tbs − mb,sˆ rs)
X
S ps(mishb − tis) ≤
X




S ps(m0shb − t0s) (ψx)
mbs ≤ 1 (γx
bs)
where the set B now includes buyer 0 and the Lagrange multipliers are given to the right. The
modiﬁed problem and the original problem have the same payoﬀ for the proposer. To see this
pick any solution to the original problem and take m0s = t0s = 0. To show that this is feasible
for the modiﬁed problem we only need to check constraints for agents with ˆ hb ≤ 0 and for h0.
However, for any such agent, their utility in both the original and modiﬁed problem is zero which
is their maximum attainable utility. Consequently, the solution to the original problem is feasible
for the modiﬁed problem and the payoﬀ for the modiﬁed problem is at least as large as the original
problem. Pick any solution to the modiﬁed problem and set mbs = tbs = 0 for any hb ≤ 0 which
must also a solution to the modiﬁed problem. To show that this solution is also feasible for the
original problem note that for any hb ≤ 0, mbs = 0 and tbs = 0 and so these agents receive their
highest possible utility and both IR and IC constraints for these agents hold. Also, dropping the
individual rationality constraints causes no change in value since any agent can still guarantee
non-negative payoﬀ by pretending to be agent 0. Consequently, the value for the original problem
must be at least as large as the value for the modiﬁed problem showing that the two payoﬀs areCOMPETITIVE MATCHING 13






























Observe that the last constraint for the dual problem is satisﬁed automatically and can be ignored
since, for any choice of γx ≥ 0,α ≥ 0,ψ ≥ 0, the left hand side is always non-positive and the right
hand side is always non-negative.
Similarly, the problem when ˆ rs is know at it’s dual are formulated as follows:
Vs = maxm,t≥0
X
B pb(tbs − mbsˆ rs)
subject to:
hbmjs − tjs ≤ hbmbs − tbs b and j
0 ≤ h0m0s − t0s
mbs ≤ 1







bj − ˆ hjαs












j0) + h0ψs ≤ γ0s.
Again, the last constraint for the dual problem can be ignored.
Let ms and ts solve the mechanism choice problem when the cost is rs is known, and let αs
γs and ψs denote a dual solution. Observe that m = (ms) and t = (ts) is a feasible choice for
the ex-ante problem since if each choice satisﬁes IC and IR0 separately, they satisfy IC and IR0
on average. This implies that V x ≥
P
s psVs. Also, observe that α = (αs), γ = (psγs) and14 ALP E. ATAKAN







s psVs ≤ V x and so V x =
P
s psVs completing the proof.
A.2. Proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 2 (No Excess 1). If max{ˆ pb, ˆ ps} > 0, then ebs ≤ 0.
Proof. For any cn and δn a seller (or buyer) can oﬀer to sell her good for δnvb∪s − δnvb − ε and
ensure that buyer b purchases if they meet, since the payoﬀ that buyer b gets from purchasing the
good strictly exceeds her continuation payoﬀ δnvb. Also, any buyer can oﬀer to buy a good for
rs + δnvn
s + ε, and ensure that she makes a purchase if she meets seller s. Consequently,
vn
s ≥ −cn + (1 − β)pn




s ≥ −cn + (1 − β)pn
b(δnvb∪s − δnvb − δnvn
s − rs)
(1 − δn)vn





b ≥ −cn + βpn
s(δnvb∪s − δnvb − δnvn
s − rs),
(1 − δn)vn
b ≥ −cn + βpn
sen
bs
Taking limits shows that ˆ pbˆ ebs ≤ 0 and ˆ psˆ ebs ≤ 0. However, since max{ˆ pb, ˆ ps} > 0, ˆ ebs ≤ 0. 
Lemma 3. Let Ln = max{Ln
B,Ln
S}, limn cnLn = 0 and limn(1 − δn)Ln = 0.
Proof. If limsupLn < ∞, then since 0 ≤ Ln, limn cnLn = 0 and limn(1−δn)Ln = 0. If limsupLn =
∞, then there must exist an agent type i with ˆ pi > 0 for whom ln
i → ∞ and so the value from
staying in the market for this type agent must be non-negative for all n large. Consequently, if
limsupLn = ∞, then there exists a buyer b with ˆ pb > 0 and vn
b (in) ≥ 0, or a seller s with ˆ ps > 0
and vn
s(in) ≥ 0, for all n large. Assume, without loss of generality, that there exists a buyer b with
ˆ pb > 0 and vn
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However, for mn
bs > 0, tn
bs ≥ δnvn
s + rs, so δnvb∪s − tn
bs − δnvn
b ≤ δnvb∪s − δnvb − δnvn
s − rs and
δnvb∪s − tn
sb − δnvn
b ≤ δnvb∪s − δnvb − δnvn









































However, since ˆ pb > 0 by Lemma 2 limn en














b + Lncn = 0
Observe since limLncn = 0, by Assumption 1, limn(1 − δn)Ln = 0. 
Lemma 4. If ˆ pb = 0, then also ˆ ebG ≤ 0, consequently, ˆ ebG ≤ 0 for all b and G.
Proof. By the argument provided in Lemma 2,
(1 − δn)vn

















s ≥ 1 for all n. However, by Lemma 3
limn((1 − δn)vn
b + cn)Ln = 0.
Consequently,
ˆ vb{s1} − ˆ vb − ˆ vs1 − rs1 ≤ 0.
Also, again by the argument provided in Lemma 2,
((1 − δn)vn





So, ˆ vb{s1,s2} − ˆ vb{s1} − ˆ vs2 − rs2 ≤ 0. Substituting gives
ˆ vb{s1,s2} − ˆ vb − ˆ vs2 − ˆ vs1 − rs1 − rs2 ≤ 0
Repeating |G| times shows that
ˆ vbG − ˆ vb −
X
s∈G(ˆ vs + rs) ≤ 0.
However, vn
bG ≥ hbG for all n and so ˆ vbG ≥ hbG. Thus
hbG − ˆ vb −
X
s∈G(ˆ vs + rs) ≤ 016 ALP E. ATAKAN
proving the result. 
Lemma 5.
P
B ˆ vb +
P




G ˆ qbG(hbG −
P
s∈G rs).
Proof. The value equations for the buyers implies
lbvb(1 − δ) ≤ β
X
s lbpsmbs(σb∪s(in)δ(vb∪s − hibG(b∪s)) + δhibG(b∪s) − δvb − tbs)
+ (1 − β)
X
s lbpsmsb(σb∪s(in)δ(vb∪s − hibG(b∪s)) + δhibG(b∪s) − δvb − tsb)
Summing up over all buyers and taking the limit as δ → 1 and observing that tbs goes to vs + rs





















bG∈T ˆ qbG(hbG − ˆ vb −
X





G ˆ qbG(hbG − ˆ vb −
X
j∈G(ˆ vj + rj))








sG ˆ qbG = 1 so
X
B ˆ vb +
X









A.3. Proof of Theorem 2. For any c and δ, 0 ≤ vi ≤ ¯ h. Let V = {v ∈ R|B|×2|S|+|S| : 0 ≤ vi ≤ ¯ h}
denote the set of possible values. The steady state measure for any agent i is bounded. For all b
and s, vs(in) < 0. then ls = 1 and vb(in) < 0, then lb = 1, by Assumption (FD). If vs(in) ≥ 0,
then ls = 1/(
P
b∈T Msb + σs(out)). If vb(in) ≥ 0, then lb = 1/(
P









s∈S Mbs + σb(out)
.
Observe that if vi(in) ≥ 0, then vi(in) ≤ −c +
P
j Mij¯ h and so c/¯ h ≤
P
j Mij. Consequently,
1 ≤ li ≤
¯ h
c . Let Λ = {l : 1 ≤ li ≤
¯ h
c} denote the set of possible steady state measures. Let mbs andCOMPETITIVE MATCHING 17
transfer tbs be the mechanism choice by the buyers and msb and tsb the mechanism choice by the























where the M’s are calculated according to σ, p and l. This deﬁnes a continuous function from
Λ × Σ × V into Λ, where (l,σ,v) 7→ l0





b)≥0 −c + β
X
ps(m0
bs(δvb∪s − δvb) − t0
bs)
+ (1 − β)
X
s




bs(rs + δvs) ≥ t0
bj − m0
bj(rs − δvs) for all s and j ∈ S
t0
bs − m0
bs(rs + δvs) ≥ 0 for all s
m0
bs ≤ 1 for all s.
Also, let S0
b,1(l,σ,v) denote the set of maximizers for the above program and
S0
b,0(l,σ,v) = arg max
σ0∈∆{in,out}
σ0v0
b(in,l,σ,v) + (1 − σ0)hbG(b).











b∈T pb(tbs + mbs(rs + δvs)) + δvs
subject to
m0
sb(δvb∪s − δvb) − t0
sb ≥ m0
sj(δvb∪s − δvb) − t0
sj for all b and j ∈ T
m0
sb(δvb∪s − δvb) − t0
sb ≥ 0 for all b
m0
sb ≤ 1 for all b
Also, let S0
s,1(l,σ,v) denote the set of maximizers for the above program and
S0
s,0(l,σ,v) = arg max
σ0∈∆{in,out}
σ0v0








deﬁnes a continuous function from Λ × Σ × V into V where (l,σ,v) 7→ v0
i for each i and deﬁnes
an upper-hemi-continuous, convex compact valued correspondence from Λ × Σ × V into V where
(l,σ,v) 7→ S0, by Berge’s Theorem of the Maximum.
However, we have deﬁned an UHC correspondence (l,σ,v) 7→ (l0,S0,v0). This correspondence
maps Λ × Σ × V into Λ × Σ × V , it is upper-hemi-continuous, compact, and convex valued; thus
by Kakutani’s theorem has a ﬁxed point. This ﬁxed point is an equilibrium for the economy.
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